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CONFLICT OF LAWS-THE SCOPE OF THE FULL FAITH AND 

CREDIT CLAUSE IN SUCCESSIVE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
AWARDs-Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 
(1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Workers' compensation law has been characterized as an en­
lightened social policy designed to provide a comprehensive system 
of financial and medical benefits to workers injured while in the 
course of employment. l Because of their unique substantive and 
procedural characteristics, the aims of workers' compensation 
schemes often are frustrated when juxtaposed with preexisting legal 
doctrines on the state and federal level. In Thomas v. Washington 
Gas Light Co.,2 the United States Supreme Court addressed difficult 
questions involving the role of res judicata, full faith and credit, and 
choice of law doctrines in workers' compensation judgments. The 
role of these doctrines in the workers' compensation field has been 
the source of fervent debate throughout the relatively brief history of 
workers' compensation law,3 and Thomas represents the Court's 
third attempt to resolve this debate. 
On January 22, 1971, Halley I. Thomas sustained a disabling 
injury to his back while in the course of his employment.4 Thomas 
was employed by the Washington Gas Light Company (WGL), a 
public utility with its principal place of business in the District of 
Columbia (District). Although he worked primarily in the District, 
it was not uncommon for Thomas to perform his duties in Virginia, 
I. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.20, at 5-9 (1978 
& Cum. Supp. Nov. 1981). 
2. 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
3. Justice Douglas perhaps best characterized this area of workers' compensation 
law when he noted that "[w]e are dealing here with highly controversial subjects where 
honest differences of opinion are almost certain to occur." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. 
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 447 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compare Wolkin, Workmen's 
Compensation Award-Commonplace or Anomaly in Full Faith and Credit Pattern?, 92 U. 
PA. L. REV. 401 (1944) with Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330 (1944) and Reese & Johnson, 
The Scope ofFull Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1949). 
4. 448 U.S. at 264. 
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the site of his injury.5 On February 5, 1971, Thomas agreed to accept 
temporary disability benefits under the Virginia Workmen's Com­
pensation Act.6 Thomas received the maximum amount of compen­
sation available under the Virginia Ace and then notified the United 
States Department of Labor that he would seek compensation under 
the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act. 8 
WGL objected to the claim filed by Thomas. WGL's objection 
was based primarily9 on the assertion that the Virginia award was 
exclusive of any other recoverylO and that the District had an obliga­
5. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Petitionerj. 
6. VA. CODE §§ 65.1-1 to 65.1-163 (1968)(current version at VA. CODE §§ 65.1-1 to 
65.1-163 (Rep. Vol. 1980 & Supp. 1981». 
7. Under the agreement, Thomas received $62 per week, retroactive to January 30, 
1971, Brief for Washington Gas Light Co. at 4, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 
448 U.S. 261 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for WGLj, "'until terminated in accord­
ance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of Vir­
ginia.''' Id. (quoting memorandum of agreement as to payment of compensation). 
These weekly benefits were terminated in 1978 when they totalled the maximum amount 
payable under Virginia law. Thomas was not receiving disability benefits at the time of 
this decision. Brief of Petitioner at 5, supra note 5. 
8. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 36-501 to 502 (West 1968). This statute adopts the pro­
visions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 901-950 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as LHWCAj. Claims filed under the District of 
Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act are administered by the United States Depart­
ment of Labor. 448 U.S. at 264 n.2. 
9. Washington Gas Light also asserted that Thomas' claim was barred because he 
did not file his claim within one year of his injury as required under 33 U.S.c. § 913(a) 
(1976), and that the LHWCA forbade the granting of an award when a worker could 
have obtained an award under a state compensation program. Brief for WGL at 7, supra 
note 7. The Court of Appeals did not consider either of these statutory arguments and 
they remained open on rehearing before the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit, relying 
on Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 141 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1944), held that the coverage of 
the District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act was not limited to navigable 
waters and was therefore applicable to Thomas' injury. Washington Gas Light Co. v. 
Thomas, 649 F.2d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that 
Thomas' claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because the limitation period 
does not begin to run until the employer forwards a report of injury to the Department of 
Labor as required by 33 U.S.C. § 930(f) (1976). The fact that Washington Gas Light 
filed similar reports with the Virginia Industrial Board was deemed insufficient for the 
purpose of commencing the one year statutory period. 649 F.2d at 277. 
10. VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (Rep. Vol. 1980 & Supp. 1981) provides: 
Employee's rights under Act exclude all others.-The rights and remedies 
. herein granted to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the 
provisions of this Act respectively to pay and accept compensation on account 
of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and reme­
dies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next 
of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or 
death. 
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tion to give the Virginia award full faith and credit, II precluding a 
successive recovery in the District for the same injury.J2 The Ad­
ministrative Law Judge for the United States Department of Labor 
ruled that the Virginia award must be given the same res judicata13 
effect in the District that it had in Virginia. Because the Virginia 
award itself would not preclude a second claim in Virginia, the judge 
concluded that res judicata could not bar a supplemental award in 
the District. 14 
WGL appealed, but the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge was affirmed by the Benefits Review Board of the United 
States Department of Labor. IS WGL then sought review before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Relying on 
the authority of Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 16 which had inter­
preted the Virginia Act to be exclusive of supplemental awards 
II. u.s. CONST. art. IV, § I: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con­
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro­
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 28 U.S.c. § 1738 (1976) provides in 
part: 
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof. . . shall have 
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its 
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 
12. 448 U.S. at 265. 
13. The term res judicata generally refers to the manner in which a judgment in 
one action affects subsequent litigation. Typically, when a judgment is rendered in favor 
of the plaintiff, the claim asserted is said to be merged into the judgment. Thus, the 
plaintiff may not bring a second suit on the same cause of action. When a judgment is 
rendered in favor of the defendant, the claim sued upon as well as those matters related 
to the claim but not actually litigated become extinguished. Thus, the original claim is 
barred by a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant. The doctrine of res judicata is 
based essentially on the concept of finality in litigated matters. In simple terms, res judi­
cata stands for the proposition that what was or what should have been litigated in a 
prior action cannot form the basis of some subsequent action. See generally F. JAMES & 
G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 527-99 (2d ed. 1977); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Ef­
fects ofPrior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1954); Developments in the Law-Res Judi­
cata--, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1952). 
14. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., No. 76-DCWC-4 at 13 (ALI, Sept. 24, 
1975) (unpublished Interlocutory Decision and Order). In addition to his conclusion that 
the Virginia award did not affect a final settlement of all of the rights and liabilities of the 
parties because the award itself contemplated further awards, the judge also expressed 
concern for the policies which underlie workers' compensation schemes in general. He 
recognized that the emphasis of such acts was to ensure employee welfare and that the 
mandate for liberal construction of such statutes in the employee's favor supported his 
conclusion regarding the intent of the Virginia Act. Id. at 14. 
15. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 9 BEN. REV. BD. SERVo (MB) 760, 766 
(Feb. 28, 1978) (No. 77-182). 
16. 587 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978), em. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). 
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under the statutes of sister states,17 the Fourth Circuit vacated the 
award granted under the District of Columbia Act. IS 
The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Jus­
tice Stevens,19 reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that "a State has 
no legitimate interest within the context of our federal system in 
preventing another State from granting a supplemental compensa­
tion award when that second State would have had the power to 
apply its workmen's compensation law in the first instance."20 
The Thomas plurality distinguished the relatively informal na­
ture of workers' compensation proceedings and the limited powers of 
state compensation tribunals from civil actions before a court of gen­
eral jurisdiction.21 In view of that distinction, the plurality con­
cluded that the application of typical choice of law concepts under 
such conditions would require a more carefully' considered choice of 
forum on the part of the injured employee than may be possible or 
desirable because an expeditious remedy may be essential.22 More­
over, the plurality emphasized the substantial interests of the District 
in having its residents fully compensated under its own statutes and 
concluded that such interests should not be subordinated by an un­
necessarily aggressive application of the full faith and credit clause.23 
This note will analyze the Court's application of the doctrines of 
res judicata, full faith and credit, and choice of law to workers' com­
pensation law. The Court's treatment of these doctrines will be ana­
lyzed in view of two competing concepts: (1) The underlying 
principles of finality and conclusiveness embodied in the full faith 
and credit clause as applied to the judgments of sister states; and 
(2) the concomitant choice of law principle that a state may not be 
17. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
18. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Thomas, 598 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448 
U.S. 261 (1980). 
19. 448 U.S. at 261. 
20. Id. at 286. 
21. Id. at 281-83. See notes 110-11 infra and accompanying text. 
22. 448 U.S. at 285. The plurality supported its determination that a more careful 
choice oflaw is required in such cases by pointing out that compensation proceedings are 
often initiated without advice of counsel who would presumably guide the injured 
worker to the most favorable forum. Additionally, the plurality pointed out that many 
times the employee still is hospitalized when compensation proceedings are instituted by 
the employer or its insurance carrier. Id. at 284. The plurality also expressed concern for 
the fact that typically, state compensation tribunals may apply only their own state's 
statutes and may not take into account the more generous remedies available under an­
other applicable workers' compensation act. Id. at 282-83. See notes 110-11 infra and 
accompanying text. 
23. 448 U.S. at 285. 
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prevented from applying its own workers' compensation laws to 
those injured workers in whom the state has a legitimate interest. 
After tracing the historical evolution of these two principles, this 
note will examine the Thomas plurality's emasculation of the first of 
these principles through its applica,tion of a choice of law "interest 
analysis" to workers' compensation judgments. Moreover, through a 
close examination of pre-Thomas case law, this note will demon­
strate that the plurality has unnecessarily upset a series of cases that 
essentially had accommodated the competing full faith and credit 
and choice of law principles. Finally, the possible abuses of the plu­
rality's rationale and the confusion that Thomas has caused in the 
lower courts will be discussed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The framers of the Constitution promulgated one of the basic 
tenets of American federalism when they proclaimed in simple and 
precise language that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State. "24 A rigid and literal interpretation of this language 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that statutes and judgments must 
be given the same force and effect throughout the union that they 
enjoy in the rendering state. Such an inflexible interpretation of the 
full faith and credit clause and its implementing statute25 has never 
been fully accepted and applied in cases dealing with this constitu­
tional mandate.26 
A. The Application ofFull Faith and Credit to Statutes 
In an effort to construct a conceptual framework, the Thomas 
plurality looked to a well developed series of Supreme Court deci­
sions that dealt with a state's interest in applying its own workers' 
compensation statutes to injured employees in which the state has an 
interest.27 
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). See note II supra. 
26. As two commentators have noted, "the language of the [full faith and credit] 
clause, taken together with that of the implementing statute, is so sweeping as to make 
inevitable the existence of some exceptions to its literal command." Reese & Johnson, 
supra note 3, at 178. See generally 4 A. LARSON, supra note I, §§ 84.00-86.50 at 16-1 to 
16-47; Cheatham, supra note 3, at 341-46; Wolkin, supra note 3, at 405-07. See also 
Freund, Chiif' Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1219-25 
(1946). 
27. 448 U.S. at 227-86. 
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The first of these cases, Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,28 
represents the early full faith and credit rule as applied to statutes. 
In Bradford, the employee was fatally injured while working for his 
employer in New Hampshire.29 The employee's residence, his prin­
cipal place of employment, and the place of the employment con­
tract were in Vermont. The employee's administratrix brought an 
action in New Hampshire for damages under New Hampshire's 
workers' compensation scheme.30 The Court held that New Hamp­
shire must give full faith and credit to the provisions in the Vermont 
Act that prohibited such actions; therefore, the action by the admin­
istratrix was barred.31 
Three years after Bradford, the Court began the development of 
what has become the "substantial legitimate interest" rule32 in 
Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission .33 In 
Alaska Packers, the employee, a nonresident alien, signed a contract 
in California to perform work in Alaska, the site of his injury.34 Al­
though the parties had agreed in their contract that the Alaska stat­
ute would apply in the event of such an injury,35 the Court held that 
California's interest in compensating the employee was sufficient to 
justify application of its own statute when the employee sought com­
pensation upon his return to California. 36 In addressing the full 
28. 286 u.s. 145 (1932). 
29. Id. at 151. 
30. Id. At the time of the action, the New Hampshire statute permitted the em­
ployee or his representative to elect, after the injury, to sue for damages at common law. 
Id. at 152 (citing N.H. Pub. L. ch. 178:11 (1926) (current version at N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 281:12 (Rep. Vol. 1955 & Supp. 1981». The Vermont statute, however, acted as 
an exclusive remedy for the employee unless an express written statement to the contrary 
was made by one of the parties. Id. at 152-53 (citing VT. GEN. LAWS ch. 241, § 5774 
(1917» (current version at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 622 (1978 & Supp. 1981». 
31. Id. at 163. The Court in Bradford rejected the assertion that New Hampshire 
had an interest in the injury and that to compel its courts to apply another state's statute 
would be obnoxious to its own public policy of allowing such actions. The Court de­
scribed New Hampshire's interest as "only casual" since the employee was not a New 
Hampshire resident. Id. at 162. Moreover, the employee was not employed continu­
ously in New Hampshire and it did not appear that he had any dependents there. Under 
such circumstances, the Court concluded that it was difficult to see how New Hamp­
shire's interests would be served by burdening its courts with this litigation. Id. 
32. Professor Larson refers to this as the "legitimate interest" rule. 4 A. LARSON, 
supra note I, § 86.30 at 16-36. The plurality in Thomas, however, appears to qualify this 
by referring to the "substantial interests" that the District of Columbia had in providing 
a supplemental recovery. 448 U.S. at 285. See notes 103-14 infra and accompanying 
text. 
33. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
34. Id. at 538. 
35. Id. 

36~ Id. at 549-50. Justice Stone, writing for the majority, expressed his concern 
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faith and credit challenges37 to California's application of its own 
law, the Court specifically rejected an inflexible application of the 
full faith and credit clause: 
A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit 
clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to 
the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of 
each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot 
be in its own.38 
Four years after Alaska Packers, the Court expanded the "sub­
stantiallegitimate interest" rule in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. 
Industrial Accident Commission.39 In Pacific Employers, the Court 
confronted the same basic factors that were present in Bradford; the 
place of injury was in California while the employee's residence, 
principal place of employment, and the place of the employment 
contract were in Massachusetts.40 In affirming California's applica­
tion of its own law, despite the purported exclusivity of the Massa­
chusetts Act, the Court recognized that the purpose of the full faith 
and credit clause "was to preserve rights acquired or confirmed 
under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requir­
ing recognition of their validity in other states."41 The Court, how­
ever, refused to apply a rigid full faith and credit standard, stating: 
[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which are re-
over the fact that the injured workman would not be able to return to Alaska to prosecute 
his claim as was agreed in the employment contract. Thus, without a remedy in Califor­
nia, there was a fear that the injured workman might become a public charge in Califor­
nia. The Court concluded, therefore, that California had a legitimate interest in 
providing the employee a remedy under California law. Id. at 542. 
37. The employer asserted that the Alaska statute afforded an exclusive remedy for 
the injury which occurred within its borders, and that California had an obligation to 
give full faith and credit to the Alaska statute so as to recognize it as a defense to the 
claim for an award under the California remedy provisions. Id. at 539. 
38. Id. at 547. Justice Stone alluded to a balancing approach in resolving 
problems such as the conflict between the Alaska and California statutes. He asserted 
that, in such cases, automatic effect should not be given to the full faith and credit clause 
because it would compel the courts of each state to subordinate its statutes to those of 
another. Instead, Justice Stone deemed it appropriate that the Court appraise the gov­
ernmental interests of each state "turning the scale of decision according to their weight." 
Id. The Court, however, has abandoned such a balancing approach in subsequent cases 
in favor of simply finding a legitimate interest. See note 102 infra. The plurality in 
Thomas, however, appears to employ such a balancing of interests in analyzing the con­
flicts between the District of Columbia and Virginia statutes. See text accompanying 
notes 103-11 infra. 
39. 306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
40. Id. at 497-98. 
41. Id. at 501. 
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served some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to 
the full faith and credit clause as a means for compelling a state to 
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing 
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to 
legislate.42 
Culminating this series is Carrol! v. Lanza,43 in which a Mis­
souri resident, hired in that state by a Missouri subcontractor, was 
injured while working in Arkansas.44 While the employee was re­
ceiving weekly benefits under the Missouri Act, he sued the general 
contractor for common-law damages in Arkansas.45 The Court held 
that the full faith and credit clause could not prevent Arkansas from 
applying its own. remedy provisions, which permitted such suits 
against third parties, even though Missouri had expressly prohibited 
them.46 Thus, the Colirt once again seized the opportunity to reiter­
ate its retreat from Bradford'S rigid application of the full faith and 
credit clause to statutes.47 
Each of these cases involved situations in which the statute of 
the forum was in conflict with a statute of another state that was 
applicable to the existing operative facts. In such a choice of law 
situation, Alaska Packers and its progeny demonstrate that statutory 
42. Id. The Court expressly refused to pennit the full faith and credit clause to be 
used as a vehicle through which a state may give extra-territorial effect to its legislation 
so as to preclude other states from prescribing for themselves the legal consequences of 
the acts occurring within their borders. Id. at 504-05. 
43. 349 U.S. at 408 (1955). 
44. id. at 409. 
45. id. at 4\0. Under the Missouri workmen's compensation act in effect at the 
time of this decision, payments started automatically on receipt of notice of the injury. 
ld. at 411 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 287.380,287.400 (1949». 
46. Id. at 413-14. The Missouri Act contained an exclusive remedy provision 
which "provide(d) that the rights and remedies granted by it 'shall exclude all other rights 
and remedies ... at common law or otherwise,' on account of injury or death." id. at 
409 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (1949». The Arkansas exclusive remedy provi­
sion, however, applied only to employee actions against his employer but not against a 
third party such as a general contractor. Id. at 4\0 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 
(1947». 
47. The Court concluded: 
(I)n these personal injury cases the State where the injury occurs need not be a 
vassal to the home State and allow only that remedy which the home State has 
marked as the exclusive one. The State of the forum also has interests to serve 
and protect. . . . Arkansas therefore has a legitimate interest in opening her 
courts to suits of this nature. . . . 
Id. at 412-13. 
As one commentator has noted, the Carroll decision essentially destroyed what little 
remained of the early full faith and credit rule as set forth originally by the Court in 
Bradford. 4 A. LARSON, supra note I, § 86.32 at 16-38. 
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conflicts are not to be resolved by resorting to a blanket application 
of the full faith and credit clause. Instead, such statutory conflicts 
should be resolved by appraising the interests of the forum to insure 
that the forum has a legitimate interest in applying its own law to 
those who have availed themselves of its courts. 
B. The Application oj'Full Faith and Credit to Judgments 
The Court traditionally has applied a more rigid interpretation 
of the full faith and credit clause to the judgments rendered by sister 
states. This more rigid approach is a manifestation of the Court's 
attempt to place the common-law doctrine of res judicata within the 
constitutional mandate of full faith and credit as applied to judg­
ments.48 The relatively inflexible application of the clause is evident 
from several decisions outside the realm of workers' compensation 
law. 
In Hampton v. M'Connel,49 Chief Justice Marshall announced 
the constitutional standard by declaring that "the judgment of a state 
court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in every other 
court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was 
pronounced...."50 In analyzing the scope of the full faith and 
credit clause it is crucial to recognize the judicial distinction between 
the measure of faith and credit accorded to statutes, and that ac­
corded to judgments pursuant to the sweeping language of Justice 
Marshall and the clause itself. While Alaska Packers and its prog­
eny placed emphasis on the importance of state interests when a 
court must make a choice of law decision, quite the opposite has 
been true when a sister state's judgment is involved. 
In Fauntleroy v. Lum,51 the Court held that a Missouri judg­
ment, based on a contract that was illegal under Mississippi law, 
must be enforced by Mississippi despite that state's prohibition of 
such activity. 52 Justice Edward White, in dissent, criticized the ma­
jority'S literal application of the full faith and credit clause to the 
48. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 75, at 148 (3d ed. 
1977); R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5 (3d ed. 1981). 
49. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818). See also Mills v. Duryee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 
481 (1813). These early cases are generally considered to be the starting point of a full 
faith and credit analysis respecting judgments. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light 
Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980). 
50. 16 U.S. at 235. 
51. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
52. The law of Mississippi had made illegal certain forms of dealing in futures and 
it prohibited its courts from enforcing any contract made in violation of that law. Id. at 
238. 
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facts before the Court. He asserted that the majority had sanctioned 
the residents of Mississippi to perform acts within that state that vio­
late that state's public policy by compelling Mississippi to enforce a 
judgment rendered in another state.53 Despite this astute observa­
tion, however, the majority chose to follow the more rigid full faith 
and credit pronouncement by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Connef. 54 
Yarborough v. Yarborough 55 is perhaps one of the best illustra­
tions of the Court's rigid full faith and credit approach to judgments. 
In Yarborough, the Court held that a Georgia judgment limiting a 
father's support obligations pursuant to a divorce decree must be 
honored in South Carolina, where his daughter then resided.56 
What is perhaps most important in Yarborough is Justice Stone's dis­
senting opinion which, as some commentators have suggested, repre­
sents the archetype for future attempts to read exceptions into the 
literal mandate of the clause with respect to judgments.57 Justice 
Stone thought it dubious that the Georgia divorce decree was in­
tended to bind the parties outside of Georgia and that the full faith 
and credit clause, as applied in this instance, permitted one state to 
control the internal affairs of another.58 Justice Stone stated that 
"there comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one 
state beyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of 
some legitimate domestic interest of the other."59 Furthermore, Jus­
tice Stone stated that the statute implementing the full faith and 
53. /d. at 240 (White, J., dissenting). 
54. The majority's reliance on a rigid and literal meaning of the full faith and 
credit clause is manifested in the Court's determination that since the jurisdiction of the 
Missouri court was not open to dispute, its judgment could not be impeached even in the 
event that the judgment was rendered through a misinterpretation of Mississippi law. Id. 
at 237. 
55. 290 U.S. 202 (1933). 
56. In Yarborough, the daughter brought an action in South Carolina to require 
her father, a resident of Georgia, to provide her with funds for her college education and 
maintenance. The Georgia divorce decree, which had been entered several years earlier 
and modified on various occasions, had provided for monetary sums to be paid by the 
father for his daughter's general support and maintenance. The father had faithfully 
followed the provisions of the Georgia decree. /d. at 204-05, 207. 
57. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 156. See generally Freund, supra note 
26, at 1226-27. 
58. 290 U.S. at 213-14 (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Stone argued that there was 
nothing in the decree itself or in the history of the proceedings in Georgia that would 
suggest that the decree was intended to control the parent-child relationship in places 
outside the state. Id. 
59. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). Perhaps Justice Stone's use of the phrase "legiti­
mate domestic interest" in Yarborough foreshadowed what was to become the legitimate 
interest rule as first articulated by him in Alaska Packers two years later. See notes 32-47 
supra and accompanying text. 
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credit clause60 had never been applied with absolute rigidity and, in 
the absence of more specific terms, the Court must determine for 
itself the degree to which South Carolina could qualify or deny the 
rights claimed under the proceedings or records of Georgia.61 
The traditionally inflexible and rigid application of the full faith 
and credit clause and the underlying principles of res judicata62 were 
carried over into the workers' compensation field in Magnolia Petro­
leum Co. v. Hunt .63 In Magnolia, the employee, a Louisiana resi­
dent, was injured while in the course of his employment in Texas. 
While confined to a hospital bed, the employee was presented with 
workers' compensation forms. He signed the forms, and the Texas 
insurance carrier began payment under the Texas compensation 
scheme.64 Upon his return to Louisiana, the employee learned that 
his interests would be better served by the Louisiana statute. He 
then notified the Texas compensation board of his intent to collect 
compensation under the Louisiana Act.65 After a hearing in Texas 
in which the employee did not participate, the Texas award became 
fina1.66 
In disallowing a successive compensation claim under the Loui­
siana Act, the Court recognized that under Texas law, the award 
granted to the employee was exclusive of any other recovery for in­
jury.67 The Court therefore reasoned that the doctrines of res judi­
cata and full faith and credit precluded Louisiana from granting a 
60. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976). See note 11 supra. 
61. 290 U.S. at 215. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) 
(North Carolina court was permitted to find that the parties to a divorce action had not 
acquired domicile in Nevada despite the finding of a Nevada court to the contrary); Fall 
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. I (1909) (in a dispute over marital property in a divorce action, the 
full faith and credit clause did not extend jurisdiction of a court of one state over prop­
erty situated in another, but only compelled the judgment to be given conclusive effect on 
the merits and subject matter of the action). 
62. See note 13 supra. 
63. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
64. Id. at 450 (Black, J., dissenting). These facts, as set forth in the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Black, reflect the various policy arguments made on behalf of a rule 
which would permit successive workers' compensation claims. Such policy considera­
tions have been persuasive in subsequent cases and rest at the foundation of the plural­
ity's holding in Thomas. See notes 103-11 & 185-92 infra and accompanying text. 
65. 320 U.S. at 450 (Black, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 433 n.2. The employee had received notice of the hearing before the 
Texas Industrial Accident Board and was aware that he was to supply the Board with 
medical evidence of his continued disability at the hearing. Upon his failure to appear 
before the Board, an award was made and the employee was notified as to the appeal 
process. No appeal was made by the employee and the award became final under Texas 
law. Id. 
67. Id. at 434-35. 
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supplemental recovery for the same injury.68 The majority in Mag­
nolia was persuaded by the discovery that the Texas legislature re­
cently had repealed the right of successive recoveries under the 
Texas Act when an award was granted previously under another 
state's law.69 This finding was grounded primarily upon Texas judi­
cial decisions.70 Thus, by analogy, the Court concluded that Texas 
additionally must have intended that an award granted pursuant to 
its laws would preclude a successive compensation award under the 
laws of another jurisdiction.7l The Court, however, expressly re­
served judgment regarding the application of the full faith and credit 
clause to situations in which the courts of the first forum would not 
construe their statute as a bar to successive claims.72 The rule that 
the full faith and credit clause as applied to judgments overrides lo­
cal policy considerations appeared to be an established Supreme 
Court doctrine. Within four years of Magnolia, however, the Court 
articulated a less rigid approach to the application of full faith and 
credit to workers' compensation judgments. 
Commentators73 have suggested that the dissenters74 in Magno­
lia saw their position vindicated in Industrial Commission of Wiscon­
sin v. McCartin.75 In McCartin, the employee, an Illinois resident 
employed in that state, was injured in Wisconsin during the course 
68. Id. at 437, 444. Justice Stone, writing for the majority, noted that this conse­
quence was necessitated by the clear purpose of the full faith and credit clause that "a 
plaintiff may not for his single cause of action secure a second or greater recovery." Id. 
at 439-40. Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected the expansion of the legitimate in­
terest approach, as set forth in Alaska. Packers and its progeny, to judgments. See notes 
32-46 supra and accompanying text. In so doing, the Court noted that Louisiana cer­
tainly had no greater interest in the injury to its resident than South Carolina had in 
requiring a father to support his child residing within that state, 320 U.S. at 440-41 (citing 
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933», or Mississippi in eliminating certain forms of gam­
bling within its borders, id. (citing Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. 230 (1908». See notes 51-61 
supra and accompanying text. 
69. 320 U.S. at 434-35. 
70. Id. Justice Black asserted that the Texas statute at issue only pertained to the 
rights granted under Texas law and did not purport to affect the right to a successive 
claim under the laws of another state. Id. at 454 (Black, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he 
rejected the res judicata assertions made by the majority by pointing out that the em­
ployee, had he failed to recover initially under the act of another state, would still be able 
to recover under the Texas Act. Id. 
71. Id. at 442. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, supra note 5. 
72. 320 U.S. at 443. 
73. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 159. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra 
note 48, at 333-34. 
74. The dissenters in Magnolia were Justices Douglas, Murphy, Black, and Rut­
ledge. 320 U.S. at 450, 462. 
75. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
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of his employment.76 The employee filed compensation claims 
under both the Illinois and Wisconsin Acts.77 While the employee's 
claim was pending in Wisconsin, a settlement contract was entered 
into by the employer and the employee under the Illinois Act. 78 The 
contract contained a clause that purported to " 'not affect any rights 
that [the] applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act of the State of Wisconsin.' "79 The Wisconsin commission sub­
sequently granted an award under the Wisconsin Act that then was 
set aside by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on the authority of 
Magnolia .80 
The matter then was presented to the United States Supreme 
Court, and the Wisconsin award was reinstated. 81 The Court dist­
inguished Magnolia by stating that the nature and effect of the Illi­
nois award in McCartin lacked the measure of finality, contemplated 
by the full faith and credit clause, which had been present in the 
Texas award in Magnolia. In analyzing the Illinois statute under 
which the judgment was rendered, the Court answered the question 
that it had expressly left open in Magnolia: 82 
[TJhere is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to 
indicate that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed to pre­
clude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state for 
injuries received there in the course of an Illinois employ­
ment. . . . Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature 
or judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction. 83 
76. Id. at 623. 
77. Id. at 623-24. The employer had objected to the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin 
Commission to hear the claim filed by the employee. Id. 
78. Id. at 624. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 626-27 (citing McCartin v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wisc. 570, 22 N.W.2d 
522 (1946». 
81. Id. at 630. 
82. See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
83. 330 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added). While the Court in McCartin may not 
have rested its decision solely on the basis of its interpretation of the Illinois statute, it is 
clear from the Court's language that it was of paramount importance in the ultimate 
result: 
[W)hen the reservation in this award is read against the background of the Illi­
nois Workmen's Compensation Act, it becomes clear that the reservation spells 
out what we believe to be implicit in that Act-namely, that an Illinois work­
men's compensation award of the type here involved does not foreclose an ad­
ditional award under the laws of another state. And in the setting of this case, 
that fact is of decisive significance. 
Id. at 630. 
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The Court's holding84 had a two-pronged effect: Not only did it 
answer the question expressly left open by the Court in Magnolia, 
but it also promulgated a rule which, in effect, virtually overruled 
that decision.85 
Such was the state of the law with regard to the scope of the full 
faith and credit clause in workers' compensation judgments. For 
over thirty years the degree of faith and credit to be accorded to such 
judgments was embodied in two Supreme Court holdings. These 
two decisions, however, did not settle the debate over the role of res 
judicata, full faith and credit, and choice of law doctrines in workers' 
compensation judgments. Thomas represents the Court's third at­
tempt to resolve the debate. 
III. THE THOMAS DOCTRINE 
A. The Demise of Magnolia and McCartin 
The narrow issue before the Court in Thomas was whether the 
award granted to the employee under the Virginia Act precluded a 
successive award under the compensation law of the District by op­
eration of the principles of res judicata and full faith and credit. 86 In 
addressing this issue, each of the three opinions rendered by the 
Court87 reflected the necessity to deal with Magnolia and McCartin. 
The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens posed a most interest­
ing approach to the Magnolia and McCartin doctrines. In applying 
those doctrines to the facts of Thomas, the plurality tentatively held88 
that McCartin was controlling because the Virginia Act did not con­
tain the unmistakable language necessary to preclude a successive 
award.89 The plurality, however, was not satisfied with the threshold 
test of unmistakable language promulgated in McCartin. The plu­
84. There is some debate as to whether the unmistakable language test was actu­
ally part of the Court's holding. Significantly, virtually all courts have considered that 
test as the Court's holding for over thirty years. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9­
10, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Brief of Petitioner at IS 
n.2, supra note 5. 
85. See 448 U.S. at 274 n.20, 275 n.22; 4 A. LARSON, supra note I, § 85.30 at 16-21; 
R. LEFLAR, supra note 48, 'at 334. 
86. 448 U.S. at 265-66. 
87. The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, Stew­
art, and Blackmun. 448 U.S. at 263. The concurring opinion of Justice White was joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. /d. at 286. The dissenting opinion of Justice 
Rehnquist was joined by Justice Marshall.' Id. at 290. 
88. Although the plurality concluded early in its opinion that McCartin was con­
trolling, its ultimate holding essentially contained no reliance on that decision. See notes 
103-14 infra and accompanying text. 
89. 448 U.S. at 269. See note 10 supra. 
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rality thought it inappropriate that, under McCartin, the Court 
found itself comparing the language of the Virginia Act, under 
which Thomas first received compensation, with the Illinois Act 
from McCartin 90 in order to resolve a federal question concerning 
the full faith and credit clause.91 Such a rule, according to the plu­
rality, inappropriately focused on the extraterritorial intent of the 
rendering state, by authorizing that state to determine the extraterri­
torial effect of its judgments by drafting or construing their statutes 
in unmistakable language.92 The plurality therefore concluded that 
the McCartin rule permitted an unwarranted infringement on the 
Court's ultimate responsibility for determining the degree of faith 
and credit to be accorded to the statutes and judgments of the several 
states.93 
As a result of its criticisms of the McCartin rule, the plurality 
then addressed the ultimate fate of the Magnolia and McCartin doc­
trines. In examining the effect of overruling one or both of those 
decisions, the plurality reflected its deep concern for the practical 
values underlying the doctrine of stare decisis. The plurality recog­
nized that the granting of successive compensation claims had been 
settled practice since McCartin .94 The plurality reasoned that the 
salutary principles of certainty and predictability in the administra­
90. The Illinois statute which the Court in McCartin held not to have unmistakable 
language provided in pertinent part: "No common law or statutory right to recover dam­
ages for injury or death sustained by any employe[e) while engaged in the line of his duty 
as such employe[e), other than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to 
any employe[e) who is covered by the provisions of this act, ...." 330 U.S. at 627 
(quoting 1913 Ill. Laws, § 6 at 335 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 
(Smith-Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1981». 
91. 448 U.S. at 269. 
92. Id. at 270. 
93. Id. at 271. The plurality determined that the McCartin rule was inconsistent 
with Justice Stone's mandate in the Pacific Employers decision that the" 'Court must 
determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or 
denial of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of 
another state.''' Id. (quoting Pacific Employers, 306 U.S. at 502). 
94. Id. at 274-75. As the plurality pointed out, the only example of the unmistaka­
ble language contemplated by McCartin appears to be present in the Nevada Act. Id. at 
275 n.21. 
[I)f an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state. . . 
accepts any compensation or benefits under the provisions of this chapter, the 
acceptance of such compensation shall constitute a waiver by such employee 
. . . of all rights and remedies against the employer at common law or given 
under the laws 0/any other state . . . . 
Id. (quoting NEV.REV. STAT. § 616.525 (1979» (emphasis by the Court). See notes 84-85 
supra and accompanying text. 
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tion of the law, which are the cornerstones of stare decisis,95 would 
not be served by reviving Magnolia or preserving McCartin as an 
unacceptable limitation on Magnolia. 96 Overruling Magnolia 97 
would not violate those principles in that there had been no signifi­
cant reliance on its rule.98 In view of the reliance on the practical 
results of McCartin, however, the plurality felt constrained by the 
principles underlying stare decisis not to expressly overrule that 
decision.99 
The plurality thus found itself left with Magnolia, which ap­
peared to rest upon sound traditional full faith and credit principles 
in not allowing successive claims, and the McCartin rule, which per­
mitted successive claims but in an inappropriate manner. Through 
this analysis the plurality determined that the full faith and credit 
issue deserved a fresh examination. loo 
B. Application of the Legitimate Interest Rule 
After expressing its dissatisfaction with the Magnolia 101 and Mc­
Cartin doctrines, the plurality assumed the task of formulating a new 
constitutional rule governing the successive claims practice. The 
plurality formulated this new rule through its application of the le­
gitimate interest rule, as delineated by Alaska Packers and its prog­
eny, and by weighing the interests of the District and Virginia in 
Thomas' claim. 102 The plurality identified three different state inter­
95. 448 U.S. at 272. See generally R. POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERI­
ENCE AND REASON (1960); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949). 
96. 448 U.S. at 277. 
97. It is emphasized that the plurality did not overrule Magnolia solely because its 
rationale had seldom been followed. The plurality, rather, overruled Magnolia on more 
specific grounds through its fresh examination of the full faith and credit issue. See note 
112 infra and accompanying text. 
98. 448 U.S. at 277. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 280-81, 284-86. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. 
102. The plurality alluded to a weighing of interests approach in examining the 
interests of the District and Virginia in the successive compensation claim by Thomas. 
448 U.S. 227-86. Such a weighing approach, although mentioned by Justice Stone in 
Alaska Packers, see note 38 supra, was abandoned by the Court in subsequent cases. See, 
e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.1O (1981); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 
408, 413 (1955); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947); Director, 
Office of Workers' Compo Programs V. Nat'l Van Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 972, 981 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980). 
Professor Larson points out that "the entire development of the successive award 
practice. . . confirms the irrelevance of 'weighing,' since if only the state with the greater 
interest could constitutionally apply its law, it would be logically impossible for two 
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ests that were affected by the potential conflict between the District 
and Virginia. 103 These interests were identified as Virginia's interest 
in limiting the liability of companies transacting business there, the 
concurrent interests of Virginia and the District in the welfare of the 
employee, and Virginia's interest in the finality of its judgments. 104 
In the plurality's view, the first two of these conflicts were re­
solved by the Alaska Packers line of cases. The plurality reasoned 
that Alaska Packers and its progeny stood for the proposition that a 
state should not be compelled to subordinate its own compensation 
statutes to those of another state through the operation of the full 
faith and credit clause. IDS The plurality determined that because 
Thomas initially could have sought a compensation award in either 
jurisdiction,I06 the employer and its insurance carrier logically would 
measure their potential liability based upon the more generous of the 
two compensation remedies. 107 Moreover, the plurality concluded 
that the concurrent interests in compensating the injured worker 
were fully served by permitting successive awards and, therefore, 
such interests did not give rise to any significant conflict. 108 
The ultimate issue for determination by the plurality was 
whether Virginia's interest in the finality of its judgments should pre-
states to make an award for the same injury." 4 A. LARSON, supra note I, § 86.35 at 16­
43. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 182 (1971). 
103. Presumably, the potential conflict that concerned Justice Stevens was the one 
which would arise if it were determined that the Virginia statute contained some unmis­
takable language which purported to preclude the subsequent claim under the District of 
Columbia Act. 
104. 448 U.S. at 277. 
105. Id. at 279. 
106. There would appear to be no significant dispute over whether Thomas could 
have sought compensation in either jurisdiction in the first instance, even if one compen­
sation scheme purported to be an exclusive remedy for the injury. When taken as a 
whole, Alaska Packers and its progeny stand for the proposition that a state may consti­
tutionally apply its own compensation act when that state is the site of the injury, the 
residence of the employee, the place of the employment contract, the location of the 
employment relationship, or the place where the parties have stipulated by contract to be 
the forum for any claims. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note I, § 86.10 at 16-33; RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § lSI (1971). 
107. Id. at 2S0. 
lOS. This is clear from the policies which originally gave rise to workers' compen­
sation laws. These statutes are designed primarily to provide benefits to an injured 
worker, without the burden of proving fault or negligence, placing the burden of support 
on the employer and indirectly on those consumers who purchase the employer's prod­
ucts. That this social policy is preferable to placing the burden on the state and its tax­
payers to support injured workers is implicit in the very existence of these statutory 
schemes. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 22-23, Thomas v. Washington Gas 
Light Co., 44S U.S. 261 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Fed. Respondent). 
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clude a successive award in the District. 109 The plurality resolved 
this issue by examining the peculiar mechanics of the workers' com­
pensation claims process. The plurality observed that a compensa­
tion tribunal typically may apply only its own state's statutes. IIO 
From this the plurality concluded that because the Virginia tribunal 
lacked the power and authority to determine Thomas' rights under 
the statutes of another jurisdiction, full faith and credit need be 
given only to those determinations that the Virginia tribunal had the 
authority to make. Therefore, because the Virginia tribunal could 
not pass on Thomas' rights under the District Act, there could be no 
constitutional objection to an adjudication of those rights by a suc­
cessive claim in the DistriCt. Ill 
Additionally, the plurality expressly dismissed the straightfor­
ward application of the full faith and credit clause by the Court in 
Magnolia. The plurality concluded that the constitutional mandate 
of the clause was satisfied because supplemental claims must give 
full effect to the factual determinations made during the first hear­
ing, and the first award must be credited toward the second so as to 
prevent a complete double recovery.1l2 
The new rule articulated by the plurality essentially mandates 
that a state may not be precluded from granting a supplemental 
award under its own compensation act when that state would have 
109. 448 U.S. at 280. 
110. Id. at 282. Compensation tribunals are typically limited to applying their 
own state statutes. This is grounded on practical reason in view of the contrasts among 
the various statutory schemes. The rights granted under such acts involve more than just 
the award of monetary sums. Tribunals are responsible for maintaining continuous su­
pervision over the entire award process to assure that claimants receive the full compli- . 
ment of available benefits, often making adjustments in those benefits when appropriate 
under that scheme. Such benefits are tied so closely with the particular state's adminis­
trative process, that it would be impractical for the forum to apply and administer the 
statutory provisions of the workers' compensation act of another state. See 4 A. LARSON, 
supra note 1, § 84.20 at 16-7 to 16-8. 
Ill. 448 U.S. 282-83. 
112. Id. at 281. The plurality, in analyzing the Magnolia decision, examined its 
reliance on Chicago, R.1. & P.R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926), which dealt with 
the res judicata effect of findings of fact in workers' compensation proceedings. The 
plurality asserted that Schendel did not compel the holding in Magnolia in that it "in­
volved the unexceptionable full faith and credit principle that resolutions of factual mat­
·ters underlying a judgment must be given the same res judicata effect in the forum state 
as they have in the rendering state." 448 U.S. at 281. It is clear that the underlying 
premise of Schendel would have been appropriately dispositive of the full faith and 
credit issue in Magnolia had there been a reexamination of the factual findings made by 
the Texas tribunal. No such reexamination took place, however, when the Louisiana 
courts attempted to fix additional compensation under its Act. See Wolkin, supra note 3, 
at 409-10. 
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had an initial opportunity to apply its own law. 113 Thus, the full 
faith and credit clause no longer may be construed to prevent succes­
sive workers' compensation claims. I 14 Significantly, such a fresh ap­
proach to the full faith and credit issue was not persuasive to five 
members of the Court. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, 
conceded that Thomas should be permitted to receive a supplemen­
tal claim, 115 yet found himself unable to join the plurality's sweeping 
rationale. Justice White thought it grossly unfair that a claimant 
should be given the additional advantage of a second adjudication 
after having had the initial choice of forum. I 16 Justice White would 
not overrule either Magnolia or McCartin even though in his mind 
the former stated the sounder doctrine while the latter rested on 
"questionable foundations."ll7 Additionally, Justice White was crit­
ical of the plurality's analysis. He stated that the plurality's ration­
ale,unlike the McCartin analysis, was susceptible to application 
beyond the realm of workers' compensation law. I IS Despite the plu­
rality's determination that factual matters decided by a compensa­
tion tribunal would be entitled to collateral estoppel effect, Justice 
White asserted that the plurality's broad holding would have impli­
cations for common tort actions.1l9 Finally, Justice White was not 
113. 448 U.S. at 286. 
114. Id. It is emphasized that the broad language in the plurality's holding is in­
consistent and confusing in view of the weighing of interests approach that the plurality 
used in reaching its decision. See notes 101-11 supra and accompanying text. Thus, it 
remains unclear whether lower courts also should employ a weighing of interests ap­
proach or simply determine whether the forum state of the second compensation claim 
initially could have applied its own law. See notes 161-84 infra and accompanying text. 
115. 448 U.S. at 286. Justice White agreed with the plurality's tentative conclusion 
that McCartin was the controlling precedent "since the Virginia Workmen's Compensa­
tion Act lacks the 'unmistakable language' which McCartin requires if a workmen's com­
pensation award is to preclude a subsequent award in another State." 448 U.S. at 289-90 
(White, J., concurring). 
116. Id. at 289. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 287. Justice White also expressed concern for the underlying principle 
of the finality ofjudgments embodied in the full faith and credit clause, and asserted that 
the plurality's analysis was at odds with that principle. Id. at 288. Justice White hypoth­
esized that the plurality's rationale may be applicable to those wrongful death actions in 
which a court enters a judgment against the defendant after choosing to apply the law of 
the forum which has set a limit on the recovery allowed. In such cases, according to 
Justice White, "[t)he plurality's analysis would seem to permit the plaintiff to obtain a 
subsequent judgment in a second forum for damages exceeding the first forum's liability 
limit." Id. at 287. An excellent illustration of this situation is presented in Semler v. 
Psychiatric Inst. of Washington, D.C., 575 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which the plain­
tiff, after receiving a favorable judgment in a wrongful death action in a federal court in 
Virginia, sued the same defendant on the same facts under the District of Columbia 
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persuaded by the plurality's conclusion that a judgment may be de­
nied full res judicata effect pursuant to the full faith and credit clause 
merely because a state's tribunal was empowered only to apply the 
law of the forum. Justice White doubted that Virginia, by empower­
ing its tribunal to apply only Virginia law to Thomas' injury, in­
tended that its judgments would not include claims arising under the 
statutory schemes of other states. 120 
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, not only criticized 
the plurality for its failure to return to what he considered "the emi­
nently defensible position adopted in Magnolia" 121 after having de­
stroyed the ratio decidendi of McCartin, but he also considered the 
plurality's application of an interest analysis to be unjustifiable. 122 
Justice Rehnquist questioned the appropriateness of applying the in­
terest analysis of Alaska Packers and its progeny and emphasized 
that the plurality had overlooked the distinction traditionally recog­
nized by the Court between the degree of faith and credit to be given 
to statutes and that which is to be given to judgments. 123 In view of 
this oversight, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the plurality's analysis 
ignored Virginia's interest in the finality of its judgments. According 
to Justice Rehnquist, such interests "lie at the very heart of the diver­
gent constitutional treatment of judgments and statutes,"124 and 
Wrongful Death and Survival Act. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 16-2701 to 2703 (West 1968 
& Supp. 1979). In Semler, the court followed the traditional applications of res judicata 
and full faith and credit in denying a second recovery, citing Magnolia as controlling. Id. 
at 929. The court noted that the res judicata effect of the Virginia judgment in the first 
action was clearly conclusive as to all of the rights and duties of the parties arising from 
the operative facts, thus distinguishing McCartin. Id. at 929 n.4l, 930-31. The court, 
however, noted that the plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate the choice of law issue as 
to whether a more generous statute could be applied to the court's determination of lia­
bility. Id. at 929 n.41. The plurality in Thomas emphasized that such an opportunity is 
not available to workers' compensation claimants, thus removing workers' compensation 
judgments from normal choice of law concepts. See notes 110-11 supra and accompany­
ing text. Because the plurality has expressly drawn such a distinction, it appears that its 
rationale will be limited to those situations in which the forum had no power to apply 
choice of law principles. Further, it appears that the Court itself wishes to limit the 
broad pronouncements of the Thomas plurality to workers' compensation cases. In Un­
derwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar­
anty Assoc., 102 S. Ct. 1357 (1982), the Court addressed the application of res judicata 
and full faith and credit principles to determinations made by the Indiana Rehabilitation 
Court. No reference was made to Thomas. 
120. 448 U.S. at 287. 
121. Id. at 291-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 292. 
123. Id. at 293. 
124. 448 U.S. at 294. Justice Rehnquist expressed his concern that Virginia's ef­
forts and expense to provide employees with a remedy for their injury, and a forum to 
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thus, an interest balancing approach to the competing interests of 
Virginia and the District is unacceptable in a scenario in which the 
full faith and credit clause is applied to judgments. 125 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist was not persuaded by the plurality's 
distinction between compensation t,ribunals and courts of general ju­
risdiction with regard to the choice of law issue in Thomas .126 While 
conceding that this distinction would be of some significance if 
Thomas somehow had been subjected to Virginia law against his 
will, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Thomas made his own 
choice of law by selecting the forum in which he filed his initial 
claim.127 Justice Rehnquist concluded that such an election, which 
resulted in an award under Virginia law, should be given the same 
constitutional treatment as a judgment awarded by a court of general 
jurisdiction. 128 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. A RPjined McCartin Analysis 
Although it did not expressly overrule McCartin, the plurality's 
rationale, if adopted in subsequent cases,129 should render McCartin 
a virtual nullity in view of the fresh examination of the full faith and 
credit issue in Thomas .130 The plurality superficially was correct in 
its assertion that the McCartin rule clashed with traditionally ac­
cepted full faith and credit principles. Its reliance onAlaska Packers 
and its progeny to strike down the ratio decidendi ofMcCartin, how­
ever, was misplaced. 
While the plurality correctly asserted that Thomas could have 
sought a compensation award in the first instance in the District, the 
plurality overlooked the distinctions traditionally drawn by the 
Court between the scope of the full faith and credit clause as applied 
to statutes and the scope of the clause as applied to judgments. I3I 
The question presented in Thomas was one concerning the faith and 
credit that one state must give to another state's judgments, as 
Thomas already had received a judgment granting him an award of 
resolve their disputes with their employers, are wasted when successive workers' compen­
sation claims are permitted. Id. at 293-94. 
125. Id. at 296. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. 
126. 448 U.S. at 294 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. 
129. See notes 162-84 infra and accompanying text. 
130. See notes 103-14 supra. See also notes 172-80 infra and accompanying text. 
131. See text accompanying notes 32-61 supra. 
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compensation under the Virginia Act. The decisions relied on by the 
plurality, however, concerned the faith and credit that one state must 
give to another state's statutes. i32 While an interest analysis is famil­
iar to the latter, it certainly is new and strange to the former in that 
state interests traditionally are ignored with respect to judgments. 133 
While Justices White and Rehnquist focused on this distinction, the 
plurality seemed to ignore it. 134 Furthermore, it appeared to the plu­
rality that the distinction between state compensation tribunals and 
courts of general jurisdiction was sufficient to carve out an exception 
to the traditional applications of the full faith and credit clause to 
judgments, thus paving the way for the application of an interest 
analysis approach. 
The plurality in Thomas broadly interpreted Justice Stone's Pa­
c!fic Employers opinion, in which he stated that "[t]his Court must 
determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels 
the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the laws of one 
state, that of the forum, by the statute of another state."135 The con­
text in which that statement was made, however, is of great signifi­
cance and should not be disregarded. Alaska Packers and its 
progeny were decisions that dealt with the scope of the full faith and 
credit clause when two conflicting state statutes were applicable to 
the same operative facts. In those cases, each of the conflicting stat­
utes was deemed to have an invalid extraterritorial effect in that each 
purported to be exclusive of all other remedies available to the em­
ployee. To apply a literal mandate of full faith and credit under 
such circumstances would force each state to enforce within its bor­
ders the conflicting statutes of another state without giving the forum 
the opportunity to enforce its own. 136 
The McCartin rationale, however, does not fit within this extra­
territorial mold. Rather, it is directed toward the intent of the ren­
dering state as to the res judicata effect of the compensation award 
granted pursuant to its own statutes. The res judicata effect of a 
judgment137 significantly depends on the law of the state that renders 
the judgment. 138 
132. See notes 101-14 supra and accompanying text. 
133. See text accompanying notes 48-72 supra. 
134. See notes 115-26 supra. 
135. 306 U.S. at 502. 
136. See text accompanying notes 33-47 supra. 
137. See note 13 supra. 
138. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 48, at 148-49; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON­
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 107-09 (1971); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 984 (1950). See generally R. CRAM­
TON, supra note 48, at 727-32. 
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In the McCartin context, under a compensation act devoid of 
any unmistakable language, StateA determines the rights of the em­
ployee arising only under that state's laws. McCartin held that it is 
implicit from the lack of such unmistakable language that State A 
does not intend to adjudicate the full compliment of the employee's 
rights to all available compensation before its tribunals so as to 
render that judgment res judicata with regard to other available rem­
edies. Rather, it has chosen to adjudicate only the rights of the em­
ployee available under its own laws, while leaving open the 
possibility of a supplemental recovery under another, applicable act. 
It follows, therefore, that its judgment was not intended to be final 
and conclusive, but rather, that it contemplated further awards and 
modifications if available. 139 
On the other hand, if the statute of State A contains some un­
mistakable language,l40 that state has decided to adjudicate the full 
compliment of the rights of the employee before that state's tribunal. 
The Thomas plurality maintained that this is an extraterritorial ef­
fect. The basic purpose of the full faith and credit clause, however, 
is to effectuate such extraterritorial results with regard to judgments 
so as to create some unifying force among the several states. 141 It 
therefore follows that there is no real extraterritorial infringement in 
the McCartin rationale but for the res judicata effect of the final 
judgment by the subsequent application of the full faith and credit 
clause itself. 
Furthermore, the application of a refined McCartin analysis ac­
commodates the plurality's concern with the peculiar mechanics be­
hind the granting of workers' compensation awards. The plurality 
observed that typically a compensation tribunal may apply only its 
own state's statutes. Because such tribunals lack the power to deter­
mine the employee's rights under the statutes of another jurisdiction, 
the plurality concluded that this places workers' compensation pro­
ceedings outside the realm of normal choice of law concepts. 142 This 
conclusion overlooked an important concept. There is no constitu­
tional requirement that the court of the forum state address itself to 
139. This is made clear in the McCartin decision by the Court's determination that 
"[s]ince this Illinois award is final and conclusive only as to rights arising in Illinois, 
Wisconsin is free under the full faith and credit clause to grant an award of compensa­
tion in accord with its own laws." 330 U.S. at 630. But see Cheatham, supra note 3, at 
340; Reese & Johnson, supra note 3, at 161-62. 
140. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.525 (1979). See note 94 supra. 
141. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948); Milwaukee County v. M.E. 
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). 
142. See text accompanying notes llO-11 supra. 
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vindicating the interests that other jurisdictions may have in the mat­
ter, provided that the forum has a significant interest in the contro­
versy.143 Thus, the distinction drawn by the plurality between 
compensation tribunals and courts of general jurisdiction is one of 
limited substance when relied upon to conclude that no real choice 
of law has been made. As Justice Rehnquist asserted, a choice of 
law is made when the claimant selects -the forum.l44 Moreover, it 
may be said that in limiting the power of its tribunals, the forum 
state has made its choice of law, that being its own statute. 145 
The limited power of workers' compensation tribunals does 
have significance, but in a different context than that set forth by the 
plurality. The forum may be aware of the additional rights that a 
claimant may have under another act, but because its tribunals are 
empowered only to apply its own remedies, the forum may not want 
to foreclose the employee's right to take advantage of those rights. 
The forum may make this choice by drafting or construing its stat­
utes without some unmistakable language, as required by the Mc­
Cartin rule. If the forum, however, does not wish to recognize these 
additional rights, it expresses this choice by using some unmistakable 
language. Justice White criticized this scenario as "grant[ing] state 
legislatures the power to delimit the scope of a cause of action for 
federal full faith and credit purposes merely by enacting choice-of­
law rules binding on the State's workmen's compensation tribu­
nals."146 What the forum actually is doing is articulating the finality 
and conclusiveness of its judgments, which are determined by the 
law of the forum rendering the judgment. 147 
In conclusion, this reexamination of the McCartin rule gives 
credence to the presumption that the McCartin Court was cognizant 
of the traditional scope of the full faith and credit clause as applied 
to judgments. McCartin did not overrule Magnolia, but rather, it 
simply recognized the state's role in determining the finality and 
conclusiveness of its judgments. The unanimous Court in McCartin 
correctly set forth a rule that remained essentially within the param­
eters of the traditional scope of the full faith and credit clause, as 
143. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 314-16 (1981); Clay v. Sun Ins. 
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 
U.S. 66, 73 (1954); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943). See gener­
ally R. CRAMTON, supra note 48, at 421-26. 
144. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra. 
145. See Brief for WGL at 44-45 supra note 7. 
146. 448 U.S. at 287. 
147. See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra. 
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applied to judgments, in that it successfully upheld the salutary com­
mon-law doctrine of res judicata which lies at the foundation of the 
clause itself. 
B. A Caveat Concerning the Interest Analysis 
It is emphasized that the Court has yet to determine the precise 
parameters of the legitimate interest rule. 148 It therefore is possible 
that lower courts and state compensation tribunals may be overzeal­
ous in finding what they consider to be legitimate interests that per­
haps are beyond the contemplation of the rule as it typically has 
been interpreted. This is especially significant in light of the lauda­
ble public policy desires to fully compensate normally productive 
workers who are injured in the course of employment. 
Two cases preceding Thomas are persuasive. In Director, Office 
of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Boughman, 149 the District of 
Columbia Circuit upheld the applicability of the District of Colum­
bia Workmen's Compensation Act when the employee, a representa­
tive of a national labor union, was murdered while at a union hall in 
California. 150 The employee's duties were directed by a regional of­
ficer in the Western United States. J5J The court, however, concluded 
that as the employer's national headquarters, the origin of the em­
ployee's paychecks, and the administration of the union pension 
fund occurred in the District, these contacts gave rise to a legitimate 
interest on the part of the DistriCt. 152 
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Na­
tional Van Lines, 153 the employee was injured in a highway accident 
while acting within the course of employment in New York State. 
The employee's residence and the employer's business were located 
in Virginia. 154 While the court noted the absence of the common 
indicia of a substantial connection between the parties and the Dis­
trict which would give rise to the District having a legitimate interest 
in the injury,155 it still upheld the applicability of the District com­
148. See note 106 supra. 
149. 545 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
150. Id. at 211. 
151. The facts of Boughman are set forth in Director, Office of Workers' Compo 
Programs v. Nat'l Van Lines, 613 F.2d 972, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 448 U.S. 
907 (1980). 
152. Id. 
153. 613 F.2d 972 (1979). 
154. Id. at 978. 
155. Id. at 979. The court stated that such common indicia of a substantial con­
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pens at ion scheme to the injury. 156 In doing so, the court determined 
that the usual indicia of a legitimate interest were of little relevance 
for two reasons. First, the court noted that the employer's headquar­
ters were located in a metropolitan area consisting of Virginia, Ma­
ryland, and the District, and that in view of the policies behind the 
statutes, the exact location of the employer's headquarters should not 
be determinative. 157 Second, the court thought that the interstate na­
ture of the employer's business made it difficult to determine one 
specific place as constituting the place of the employment relation­
ship.158 As the employer serviced the District, the court concluded 
that the District had an interest in the outcome of the controversy. 159 
In light of this potential for an overzealous search to find a legit­
imate interest, it is clear that the plurality's holding in Thomas falls 
prey to its own criticism of McCartin. The plurality in Thomas as­
serted that the McCartin rule delegated to the states the Court's ulti­
mate authority to arbitrate federal questions concerning the full faith 
and credit clause. 160 The holding of the plurality, however, permits 
the states through their courts and administrative tribunals to deter­
mine when a legitimate interest exists so as to render a forum state's 
compensation act applicable to a given injury. Therefore, until the 
Court determines the parameters of the legitimate interest rule, 
Thomas also may be criticized as placing upon the states the Court's 
responsibility for determining the scope of the full faith and credit 
clause. 
C. Application ofthe Thomas Doctrine 
Nearly thirty years ago one judge noted: "Perhaps it is not too 
much to hope the Court which rendered the Magnolia and McCartin 
opinions will, when the opportunity is presented, clarify them, or 
perhaps state an easily understood rule to be applied in such 
nection are the place of the employee's residence, headquarters of the employer and the 
place of contracting. Id. See note 106 supra. 
156. 613 F.2d 982-83. 
157. Id. at 979. The court added that the Washington, D.C. area constituted the 
most significant geographical division and it used this fact in liberally granting to the 
District of Columbia authorities jurisdiction over the injury. Id. 
158. Id. The employer, Eureka Van & Storage Company was a small operation 
serving the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. The employer served as an agent for 
National Van Lines and operated trucks displaying the colors and emblems of that com­
pany. Id. at 978. 
159. Id. at 981. The court emphasized the interest that the District had in assuring 
those who may work within its borders that they would be adequately protected if in­
jured. Id. 
160. 448 U.S. at 271. 
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cases."161 While the Court clearly was presented with such an op­
portunity in Thomas, it appears that the initial reactions of state and 
federal courts are composed of confusion and unfulfilled hopes. 
The Fifth Circuit recently dealt with the successive compensa­
tion claim dilemma in Landry v. Carlson Mooring Service .162 In Lan­
dry, the employee suffered a heart attack in Texas and filed 
compensation claims against. his employer under the Longshore­
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)163 and 
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act. l64 The parties then de­
cided to settle the case and submitted their settlement to a Texas 
court as required under Texas law. The settlement resulted in a 
lump sum award to the employee. 165 After receiving the award, the 
employee executed a general release purporting to discharge the lia­
bility of the employer's insurer for all claims arising from the em­
ployee's injury. 166 The employee then withdrew his claim under the 
LHWCA. The employee subsequently reopened his claim under the 
LHWCA and was granted a supplemental award. 167 This award was 
vacated on appeal on res judicata and full faith and credit 
grounds. 168 The Fifth Circuit reinstated the award, noting that 
Thomas seemed to be dispositive of the issue. 169 The Fifth Circuit, 
however, ultimately applied the McCartin unmistakable language 
test in rendering its decision. The court characterized the preceden­
tial impact of Thomas as being unclear in view of the three, contrast­
ing opinions rendered by the Court and determined that a majority 
of the Justices would agree that the McCartin rule should control. 170 
161. LaRue v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 57 N.M. 93, 97, 254 P.2d 1059, 1062 
(1953). 
162. 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). 
163. 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (1976). 
164. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1981). Initially, 
the Texas Industrial Accident Board dismissed the employee's claim, but on review, the 
state district court held that the claim was not barred by the employee's additional 
LHWCA claim. 643 F.2d at 1082. 
165. 643 F.2d at 1082. 
166. Id. The release stated, in part, that the insurer would be discharged from 
liability for all .. 'claims . . . or kind of action whether at common law or under any 
statute, state or federal. . . growing out of. . . personal injuries alleged to have been 
sustained and suffered' " by the employee. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. In vacating the award, the Benefits Review Board reasoned that the Texas 
courts would have given the judicially approved award under the Texas Act res judicata 
effect and that Magnolia required that full faith and credit be given to that final judg­
ment. Id. 
169. Id. at 1084. 
170. Id. at 1085. The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion by asserting that" 'the 
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In applying the McCartin rule, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the Texas Act did not contain the necessary unmistakable language 
to preclude a successive award. In reaching this decision, the court 
used the commentary of the plurality opinion in Thomas regarding 
the strictness of the McCartin rule and used Nevada's compensation 
statute as the paradigm for determining when a statute contains the 
preclusive unmistakable language contemplated by the McCartin 
rule. 171 
Another enlightening application of Thomas was presented by 
the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Webb v. Arizona Public Service 
Co.172 In Webb, the injured employee received temporary benefits 
under the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act pursuant to a 
claim filed by his employer. 173 While his requested hearing to deter­
mine whether his injuries entitled him to permanent benefits was 
pending, the employee filed a compensation claim in New Mexico 
under its Act.174 The Industrial Commission of Arizona subse­
quently found that the employee was not entitled to permanent disa­
bility benefits, and the employee filed a petition for review of that 
finding with the Court of Appeals of Arizona.175 While the em­
ployee's appeal was pending, the trial of the New Mexico claim was 
held wherein the New Mexico District Court, over res judicata and 
full faith and credit objections by the employer, found that the em­
ployee was permanently disabled. 176 On appeal, the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals, in addressing the full faith and credit issue, stated 
that it was compelled to apply the Magnolia and McCartin doctrines 
in view of the divergent and confusing opinions rendered by the 
Court in Thomas.177 The court, however, never expressly analyzed 
the language of the Arizona compensation statute under which the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who con­
curred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.''' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justice Stewart». The court concluded, 
therefore, that it was judicially sound to reach its decision on the more limited grounds 
provided in the concurring opinion rather than on the broad holding of the plurality in 
Thomas. Id. The court emphasized, however, that "at best our determination of the 
precedential value of Thomas is premised on an educated guess concerning what view a 
majority of the Court could agree upon." Id. at 1085 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
171. Id. at 1085-86. See note 94 supra. 
172. 95 N.M. 603, 624 P.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1981). 
173. Id. at 606, 609, 624 P.2d at 548, 551. See note 190 infra. 
174. Id. at 605, 624 P.2d at 547. 
175. 95 N.M. at 606, 624 P.2d at 548. 
176. Id. The employer asserted that the same hearing between the same parties 
involving the same issues litigated previously in Arizona precluded such a hearing in 
New Mexico. Id. 
177. Id. at 607, 624 P.2d at 549. 
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first award was granted to determine whether it contained some un­
mistakable language that would preclude the successive claim under 
McCartin.178 The court simply paraphrased the plurality's holding 
in Thomas 179 and summarily concluded that the Arizona award was 
final and conclusive only as to the rights granted under Arizona 
law. 180 
Of additional interest in Webb is what the court identified as the 
ultimate issue: whether New Mexico could disregard any of the de­
terminations made by the Arizona compensation tribunal.1 81 The 
court clearly was referring to the factual determination made by the 
Arizona Commission that the employee was not permanently dis­
abled. 182 The Thomas plurality emphasized the unexceptionable full 
faith and credit principle that factual determinations of state tribu­
nals are entitled to the same res judicata and full faith and credit 
effect in the second state as that accorded to findings by a court of 
general jurisdiction. 183 The court in Webb, however, was able to 
avoid this restriction. As the employee's appeal regarding the suffi­
ciency of the findings of fact made by the Arizona Commission was 
pending, the court determined that those findings did not demand 
res judicata effect in New Mexico. 184 
178. The only statute analyzed by the court was the applicable New Mexico stat­
ute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-65 (1978). 95 N.M. at 606, 624 P.2d at 548. That statute, 
however, addresses only whether New Mexico will permit successive claims within its 
own jurisdiction under its Act. The proper McCartin analysis requires scrutiny of the 
Arizona statute to determine if it contained some unmistakable language so as to pre­
clude New Mexico from applying its Act in view of a final judgment in Arizona. 
179. 95 N.M. at 608, 624 P.2d at 550. 
180. Id. at 609, 624 P.2d at 551. The court's injection of the McCartin rationale at 
the end of its opinion is inconsistent with the actual thrust of the opinion itself. The 
court, based upon the rationale of the Thomas plurality, determined that it was extremely 
doubtful that Arizona could preclude New Mexico from granting a successive award "by 
any legal device." Id. If such a premise was fully accepted, the McCartin decision would 
become a virtual nullity in that under its rationale, a state could, by using some unmis­
takable language, prevent another state from awarding a supplemental claim. See notes 
103-14 supra and accompanying text. The application of the McCartin test by the court 
in Webb, therefore, clearly indicates the confusion which has been generated by the di­
vergent opinions rendered by the Court in Thomas. 
181. 95 N.M. at 608, 624 P.2d at 550. 
182. Id. at 606, 624 P.2d at 548. 
183. 448 U.S. at 281. 
184. 95 N.M. at 608, 624 P.2d at 550. See Chapman v. St. John Drilling Co., 73 
N.M. 261, 266, 387 P.2d 462, 465 (1963) (res judicata effect not required to be given to an 
award under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act when an appeal of the award was 
pending in Texas). 
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D. The Favorable Policy ofPermitting Successive Claims 
It is apparent that the Thomas plurality was concerned with 
what may legitimately be labeled an imbalance of bargaining power 
that often exists between employers and employees. Perhaps one of 
the best illustrations of this imbalance was articulated by Justice 
Black in Magnolia: 
Confined to a hospital bed [the employee] was told that he could 
not recover compensation unless he signed two forms presented to 
him. As found by the Louisiana trial judge there was printed on 
each of the forms "in small type" the designation "Industrial Acci­
dent Board, Austin, Texas." To get his compensation [he] signed 
the forms and the Texas insurer began to pay.185 
The Thomas plurality emphasized the informal nature of work­
ers' compensation proceedings. The plurality noted that such pro­
ceedings often are initiated while the employee still is in the hospital 
and without advice of counsel, who presumably would guide the em­
ployee to the most favorable forum.186 In view of this informality, 
the plurality concluded that a rule forbidding successive compensa­
tion recoveries requires a more formal and careful choice oflaw than 
may be possible or desirable when an expeditious remedy may be 
essential. 187 
An additional factor behind a policy that favors successive 
awards is that the benefits themselves often are settled through infor­
mal agreements that are encouraged under many statutory schemes 
to expedite a subsistence level of benefits to the injured employee. 188 
In view of this informality, it often is asserted that the acceptance of 
benefits by the typical employee is often an uninformed decision and 
should not constitute a choice of law decision invoking the full faith 
and credit clause. 189 
Furthermore, there is the threat that employers and their insur­
185. 320 U.S. at 450 (Black, J., dissenting). 
186. 448 U.S. at 284; see note 22 supra. 
187. 448 U.S. at 284-85. See, e.g., Bekkedahl v. North Dakota Workmen's Com­
pensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1974), in which the court noted that had the 
injured employee been informed of the comparative merits of the two applicable state 
schemes, he would have easily noted the superior benefits of one over the other. In addi­
tion, the court noted that the employee had very recently undergone serious brain sur­
gery and was still recovering when asked to file his claim. Id. at 845-46. 
188. Brief for Petitioner at 20, supra note 5. 
189. Id. In Thomas, the employee, without the advice of counsel and within two 
weeks of his injury, executed an agreement to accept compensation benefits under the 
Virginia statute. Id. at 5. 
509 1982] WORKERS' COMPENSA TlON AWARDS 
ance carriers, who generally are more aware of the comparative ad­
vantages and disadvantages of the statutory schemes involved, may 
engage in overreaching by steering the injured employee toward the 
less favorable forum.190 
The policy considerations that favor the successive claims prac­
tice no doubt are a manifestation of the strong public policy of pro­
viding medical benefits and financial assistance to those injured in 
the course of employment. Justice Rehnquist, however, properly 
questioned whether the broad holding of the plurality was necessary 
to fulfill these policy considerations. Justice Rehnquist correctly 
noted that there was no evidence of employer overreaching in 
Thomas and that had there been any" 'fraud, imposition, [or] mis­
take' " in the filing of Thomas' claim, the award could have been 
vacated upon timely motion. 191 
The threshold question with regard to the policies that underlie 
the successive claims practice is whether they may be given such 
weight so as to override the relatively inflexible constitutional man­
date requiring that full faith and credit be given to the judgments of 
sister states. Prior to Thomas, it had been well established that local 
policy interests could not be used as a tool to carve exceptions out of 
that constitutional mandate. 192 Today, however, it is clear that at 
least four members of the Court are persuaded that policy considera­
tions must be taken into account in the realm of workers' compensa­
tion judgments. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light CO.,193 the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine the degree of faith and credit constitutionally 
required to be given throughout the union to workers' compensation 
judgments. In tracing the historical treatment given to this issue, it is 
190. Brieffor Fed. Respondent at 29-30, supra note 108. It is often the. employer or 
his insurance carrier who initiates the compensation claim pursuant to many statutory 
schemes. Such was the situation in Webb, 95 N.M. 603, 624 P.2d 545. See notes 172-84 
supra and accompanying text. In Webb, the court expressed concern over this fact when 
it noted that the complexities involved in the application of full faith and credit and res 
judicata doctrines in workers' compensation cases result in a "race to the courthouse" 
between the parties, with the employer often initiating proceedings in the least favorable 
forum before the employee could select his own forum with the assistance of counsel. 95 
N.M. at 606, 609, 624 P.2d at 548, 551. 
191. 448 U.S. at 295 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v. Diamond Con­
str. Co., 184 Va. 711, 720, 36 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1946» .. 
192. See text accompanying notes 48-61 supra. 
193. 448 U.S. 261 (1980). 
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clear that workers' compensation judgments represent what may be 
called a pigeonhole exception to the relatively literal mandate of the 
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing 
statute. 194 
The Court had encountered the issue presented in Thomas on 
two previous occasions. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,195 the 
Court dramatically changed the accepted practice of permitting suc­
cessive workers' compensation claims by applying a rigid and literal 
interpretation of the clause to workers' compensation judgments. In 
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,196 the Court per­
mitted a return to the successive claims practice by focusing on the 
statutory construction of the compensation act through which the 
first judgment was rendered. Under McCartin, a successive claim 
was permissible unless the first state, through some unmistakable 
language, expressed its desire to make its judgment final and 
conclusive. 
The Thomas plurality, although recognizing that the successive 
claims practice had been accepted by virtually every jurisdiction, 
was dissatisfied with the McCartin test and characterized it as per­
mitting the states to give their statutes extraterritorial effect. More­
over, as the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of full faith and credit 
questions, the plurality concluded that the McCartin rule permitted 
an unwarranted state infringement on that exclusive role of the 
Court. Thus, the Thomas plurality found it necessary to promulgate 
a new constitutional standard. In concluding that the full faith and 
credit clause could no longer be construed to preclude successive 
workers' compensation claims, the plurality was influenced by the 
various policy justifications which lie at the foundation of a rule per­
mitting such claims. The plurality determined that such policy con­
siderations outweigh a state's interest in the finality of its judgments, 
notwithstanding that such an interest is the cornerstone of the full 
faith and credit clause as applied to judgments. 
To reach this conclusion, the Thomas plurality relied on a well 
developed series of choice of law decisions that had applied an inter­
est analysis test in determining the degree of faith and credit to 
which the statutes of sister states were entitled. The Thomas plural­
ity applied this more flexible interpretation of the clause, tradition­
ally applied to statutes, to workers' compensation judgments. 
194. See note 11 supra. 
195. 320 U.S. 430 (1943). 
196. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
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While Thomas may not significantly change the outcome of for­
mal challenges to supplemental claims, the plurality was successful 
in fashioning a rule that is tailored to remain constant with the prac­
tical results of McCartin. In reaching this goal, however, the plural­
ity has promulgated a rule that now mandates an ostensibly 
mechanical application of the interest analysis doctrine. In the suc­
cessive workers' compensation claim scenario, therefore, one need 
only to find that the forum could have applied its law to the opera­
tive facts of an injury in the first instance in order to give the forum 
the power to grant a supplemental award, despite any purported 
finality of the first judgment. 
It was unnecessary for the plurality to paint with such a broad 
brush. A more careful look at the McCartin rationale leads to the 
conclusion that it is not subject to the plurality's criticisms. McCar­
tin simply recognized the sovereign rights of the several states to de­
termine the finality and conclusiveness of the judgments granted 
under their own laws. Thus, the McCartin doctrine itself is not 
within the extraterritorial mold in which the plurality has placed it; 
rather, it is the subsequent triggering of the literal mandate of the 
full faith and credit clause that gives extraterritorial effect to statu­
tory rights ripened into judgments. The McCartin rule recognized 
the right of the rendering state to determine the finality of its judg­
ments while still remaining within the traditional parameters of the 
full faith and credit clause. 
In view of the reservations expressed by the concurring and dis­
senting opinions over the plurality's new approach to the successive 
claims practice, the precedential value of Thomas is yet to be deter­
mined. Nevertheless, it is clear from the lower court decisions it has 
spawned, that the lack of significant judicial harmony among the 
members of the Court on this highly controversial issue can breed 
only uncertainty and confusion. 
John D. Mi/elli 
